China’s Drinda Scraps Oman Solar Project as Mideast Expansion Faces Headwinds
- Chinese solar PV production plans in Middle East face roadblocks
- Protectionism, geopolitics and export controls undermine viability
- Drinda’s 5GW solar cell project in Oman is the latest casualty
Major solar cell manufacturer Drinda New Energy Technology said on Friday that it would terminate its planned 5 gigawatts high-efficiency solar cell manufacturing project in Oman, citing escalating trade tensions, geopolitical instability in the Middle East and tighter controls on Chinese solar technology exports.
Drinda said international trade frictions have intensified since the second half of 2025, alongside continued tariff adjustments. The outbreak of large-scale conflict in the Middle East in early 2026 further heightened risks to logistics routes, supply chain security, personnel safety and the project’s long-term operations.
The company also pointed to China’s proposed revisions to its Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited or Restricted from Export, announced by the Commerce and Science and Technology Ministries in October. The revisions would add to the catalogue certain photovoltaic technologies, including key technologies and core equipment related to solar cells, and introduce temporary registration requirements for relevant technology exports. Drinda said the changes could increase regulatory uncertainty and compliance requirements for cross-border technology and equipment transfers.
Following a comprehensive assessment of these risks, Drinda concluded that the Oman project was no longer viable. It will instead redirect the HK$963 million ($123 million) originally raised for the project toward product research and development, technology upgrades, production line modifications, strategic raw material procurement and working capital.
Market sources said the decision marks a significant retreat from Drinda’s overseas manufacturing ambitions, which were initially aimed at establishing production capacity outside China to serve higher-margin international markets.
From a 10 GW Plan to Project Termination
According to its website, Drinda had 40 GW of N-type solar cell capacity as of 2025, with full-year shipments of 29.54 GW. Overseas sales accounted for more than 50.8% of total sales, underscoring its reliance on international markets.
Drinda first unveiled its Oman ambitions in June 2024, proposing a 10 GW high-efficiency solar manufacturing base to be developed in two 5 GW phases, targeting the U.S. and other higher-margin markets as well as regional demand.
In July 2024, Drinda announced a proposed investment of $280 million to establish the 5 GW solar cell manufacturing facility in Oman, with completion initially expected in 2025.
In October that year, Jietai New Energy Technology OM (FZC) SPC, the project’s investment and operating entity, signed a land lease agreement with Sohar Free Zone LLC. However, the project subsequently faced delays, with sources familiar with the matter telling Dow Jones Energy that construction had fallen behind schedule.
At a solar conference held in Shanghai in June 2026, a source told Dow Jones Energy that the project had been put on hold over concerns about its Chinese-linked ownership structure and potential supply chain traceability implications. The company was reportedly exploring the introduction of a new shareholder to restructure or replace the existing investment arrangement and mitigate compliance and technology export risks.
Oman was not Drinda’s only planned overseas manufacturing destination. In June 2025, the company announced a partnership with Turkish solar panel manufacturer Schmid Pekintas Energy to develop a 2 GW solar cell facility in Turkey.
However, an industry insider told Dow Jones Energy at the time that this cooperation was still at an early stage, with the partnership structure and allocation between domestic sales and exports still under discussion. No construction timeline had been established, and the project was unlikely to move forward in the near term.
Middle East Solar Ambitions Lose Momentum
The Middle East emerged as an attractive destination for Chinese PV manufacturers two years ago, as shifting U.S. trade policies disrupted established supply chains in Southeast Asia and prompted companies to seek alternative production bases. With the U.S. market offering higher module prices, manufacturers increasingly looked to the region to diversify production while maintaining access to higher-margin export opportunities.
According to an industry insider, overseas facilities typically serve two purposes: meeting local demand and supplying the U.S. market.
Against this backdrop, approximately 15 Chinese manufacturers announced plans to establish PV manufacturing facilities across the Middle East from 2024 onward, according to Dow Jones Energy’s tracking. However, progress has largely fallen short of expectations, with many projects remaining at the announcement stage and operational facilities struggling to ramp up production.
In Oman, one operational polysilicon project has temporarily suspended production after struggling to secure long-term offtake agreements, according to market sources. The project is awaiting greater clarity on international policy developments before deciding on its next steps.
Another manufacturer with 6 GW of commissioned solar cell capacity in Oman had planned to increase its operating rate in the second quarter of 2026 and reach full production in the third quarter. However, disruptions to the transportation of critical production materials amid the regional conflict have reportedly stalled its ramp-up, leaving the facility operating at around 50%.
Meanwhile, several upstream PV projects announced in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have yet to show tangible progress, with industry sources reporting no meaningful updates either through official announcements or market channels.
Protectionist Policies and Geopolitical Tensions Weigh on Overseas Expansion
According to industry participants, shifting trade policies, geopolitical instability and technology export controls are increasingly undermining the commercial viability of Chinese players’ overseas PV investments.
The U.S. One Big Beautiful Bill Act, passed in 2025, introduced a more explicit definition of a Prohibited Foreign Entity, tightening procurement requirements for solar developers seeking to retain eligibility for investment tax credits. With China falling within the scope of restrictions related to Foreign Entities of Concern, Chinese manufacturers investing overseas must carefully structure their ownership and equity arrangements to satisfy U.S. supply chain due diligence requirements, an industry source said. This has weakened the appeal of the Middle East as an export platform to the U.S., with Chinese-linked overseas facilities facing greater scrutiny over ownership and control.
U.S. trade measures have added further pressure. In August 2026, the country announced the findings of its Section 232 national security investigation into imports of polysilicon and its derivatives, alongside minimum import price measures covering the PV supply chain and an additional 15% ad valorem tariff on downstream products, all set to take effect on Dec. 4.
Although the measures do not directly target Middle Eastern exports, one industry insider said they effectively create a price barrier around the U.S. market, potentially encouraging manufacturers to relocate production domestically.
“Projects outside China that seek to enter the U.S. market no longer have a straightforward path to commercial viability. The expected return on investment is no longer as disproportionate as previously anticipated, and the Middle East has seen its potential competitive advantage diminish following the outcome of the US Section 232 investigation,” the source said.
Regional instability has further weakened the investment outlook. A source at another Chinese solar manufacturer described the Middle East as highly volatile, with an uncertain outlook, adding that financial pressures on regional governments had made many earlier investment projections increasingly difficult to achieve.
Meanwhile, China’s tightening controls on advanced PV technology exports present another obstacle. Proposed revisions to the country’s technology export catalogue in October could impose additional compliance requirements on overseas transfers of high-efficiency solar technologies and related core equipment, complicating the establishment and operation of overseas facilities. One manufacturer said the measures could slow overseas capacity expansion further by limiting the spread of advanced production technologies and preventing additional capacity from exacerbating industry overcapacity and price competition.
China’s wafer export data also highlight the slow development of downstream manufacturing capacity outside the country. According to the Silicon Industry Branch of the China Nonferrous Metals Industry Association, China exported 8.98 GW of wafers in September 2026, including 4.23 GW to India and 2.30 GW to Laos, with Vietnam and Indonesia among the other major destinations.
One industry participant noted that the export pattern has remained largely unchanged in recent years and expects Southeast Asia and India to remain the main destinations in the near term, reflecting the limited expansion of solar cell manufacturing capacity elsewhere.
Against this backdrop, an industry observer said the window for Chinese PV manufacturers to establish overseas production capacity was narrowing. With markets outside the U.S. yet to impose substantial restrictions on competitively priced Chinese solar imports, while U.S. domestic manufacturing capacity continues to expand, the commercial rationale for building production facilities overseas is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.
“Against this backdrop, Drinda’s decision to terminate the Oman solar cell project may be just the beginning. I believe the current wave of overseas capacity expansion by Chinese solar manufacturers is approaching its end,” the source said.
By Summer Zhang, Brian Ng and Jun Won Lee
